Crisis Management Capabilities in Maritime Trading Systems by Barnes, Paul
 1
The Australian New Zealand International Business Academy  
 
 
Crisis Management Capabilities in Maritime Trading Systems  
by 
Dr Paul Barnes, 
School of International Business 
Queensland University of Technology 
GPO Box 2434, Brisbane, QLD 4001 Australia 
Tel: +61 7 3964 9019; Fax: +61 7 3864 1771; 
E-mail: p.barnes@qut.edu.au 
 
Abstract: 
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Security concerns and systemic vulnerability within trading systems are critical factors in 
international business success.   Failure to embed organisational capabilities to deal with 
vulnerability can contribute to preventable losses.  This paper presents a conceptual framework 
for understanding where vulnerability may impact trading systems and suggests that crisis 
management capabilities within organisations dealing maritime trade (especially ports) can 
increase the ability to identify early warning signs of the emergence of crisis situations.    
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Introduction: 
The events of September 11, 2001 precipitated a range of unilateral and multilateral responses to 
security threats internationally.  The initial focus of crisis management in the United States (U.S.) 
was shutting down domestic airspace but attention moved quickly to the security of maritime 
transport.  Maritime trade as a vector for the delivery of terrorist acts to the U.S. mainland was of 
particular concern and recognised as a focus of attention.   
 
More recently the post-Iraq war insurgency has generated concern among multinational 
corporations (MNC’s) active in reconstruction projects in many locations in that country and 
elsewhere in the world.  While the threat environment in Iraq remains suited to conventional 
(and unconventional) war fighting, uncertainties elsewhere in the international business world 
remain opaque and difficult to clarify.   
 
This paper argues that the complete elimination of emergencies or other catastrophic 
events that might impact directly or indirectly on business is impossible but that much can be 
done to reduce the likelihood of security-related incidents.  The paper begins by discussing the 
costs of terrorism to global business and Australian interests generally.  It then examines 
maritime trade as a complex system and the vulnerabilities inherent within it from the 
perspective of research findings on large-scale systems failures.  It concludes by suggesting that 
the threats and uncertainties affecting global business can be partially mitigated by ensuring that 
adequate crisis management capacities are adopted by organisations active in international 
settings.                
 
The Costs of Terrorism to Business  
Terrorism and the possibility of future terrorist incidents introduce high levels of 
uncertainty to business considerations and the world economy generally.  Recent analysis has 
suggested that investment in the United States dropped by up to 0.2 percent of GDP as a result of 
terrorist threats.  Developing economies have also been impacted by the network effects of the 
World Trade Centre (WTC) disaster.  Certain economies within the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) region have also been affected with decreased Foreign Direct Investment 
and existing vulnerability due to reliance on maritime trade and the presence of ongoing 
instances of piracy (Commonwealth of Australia 2003; OECD, 2003).        
 
The September 11 attacks against the WTC lead to $19 USD Billion in insured property 
losses and an estimated economic loss from of up to $90 USD Billion in 2001 terms (Schaad, 
2002).   The combined effect on wealth and income accounted for a significant proportion of the 
total economic loss of the September 11th disaster.  Currently, an international approach in 
insurance practice is to establish a public/private partnerships in which all stakeholders bear a 
portion of the risk depending on their financial capacity. Large portions of the terrorism risk are 
insured through specific pools, and governments assume a role as insurers of the last resort 
(Schaad, 2002). 
 
Global business enterprise and the Australian commercial ‘footprint’ overseas is 
vulnerable to terrorist incidents.  In 2003 Australia derived approximately 20 % of GDP from 
exports (Jennings (2003).  A significant reduction in these levels would cause considerable 
downturn in the economy.  As maritime trade is the prime mover of Australian exports, 
compliance with the International Maritime Organisation - International Ship and Port Security 
(ISPS) requirements is a critical issue.  The cost of compliance by relevant Australian flagged 
vessels is likely to vary from between $750,000 to $900,000 AUD per ship (Higgins, 2003).  
While these requirements will result in more efficient trade in the long term, short-term costs for 
exports will increase.  The cost for international implementation of the ISPS is estimated to be 
$1,983.8 million USD with an annual maintenance cost of $731 million (OECD, 2003). 
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In addition to these treaty requirements the United States has proposed a series of 
voluntary programmes aimed at enhancing security of trade into North American seaports. While 
not binding on trading partners, these measures are intended to provide levels of security 
assurance for the U.S. (and trading partners indirectly) about the movement of cargo by 
participating ports, carriers and companies.  These measures are intended to provide a 
competitive advantage to early voluntary adopters over time.   The two principal American 
voluntary programmes are the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the Customs-Trade 
Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT). 
 
The CSI seeks to develop bi-lateral agreements between the U.S. and foreign countries to 
pre-screen high-risk containers in ports of loading. While the majority of containers do not pose 
any security threat all identified high-risk containers will be inspected, either before loading at a 
CSI port or, if arriving from another port, upon arrival in the United States.  In CSI ports, local 
customs officials and U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection staff would jointly decide 
on which containers to inspect before loading. 
 
The C-TPAT aims to ensure that participants implement policies, plans and procedures to 
ensure the integrity of their entire supply chain including the maritime transport components.   
 
While the CSI and C-TPAT are sound strategies for addressing container security, there 
is recognition that they represent only a framework for building a maritime security regime, and 
that significant gaps in security coverage remain (Frittelli, 2003).  Beyond the contention of 
ongoing gaps in security coverage there is, arguably, varied appreciation of the complexity of the 
international trading system itself, in particular the interface between port and host country.    
 
A sea-borne terrorist incident would impact heavily on the availability and cost of marine 
insurance.  Premiums were tripled for ships calling at ports in Yemen after the 2002 terrorist 
attack on French oil tanker Limburg off the Yemeni coast.  This forced many vessels to cut 
Yemen from their schedules or divert to ports in neighbouring states.   In addition to increased 
insurance and re-insurance costs a catastrophic sea-borne terrorist attack would cause delays in 
shipping or in a best case, increase transit times for commodity movements.  Such disruptions of 
the supply chain would have repercussions around the world and profoundly affect business 
confidence (Richardson, 2004). 
 
The quantum of loses from a significant maritime trade disruption was noted following a 
simulated shutdown of a large port on the U.S. west coast for nine days.  The projected backlog 
of containers was estimated to have required three months to clear with a total cost of $58 Billion 
USD to the U.S. economy (OECD, 2003).     
  
Managing Risk in Complex (Trading) Systems 
A security incident (or multiple concurrent incidents) may occur at any time in large 
highly complex systems such as a supply chain or trading network.  Incidents might occur in a 
number of ways; by emerging suddenly due to the interaction of previously separated system 
elements or may ‘cook slowly (without recognition) until they appear.  In either case the 
incidents are often surprising and unexpected.  The literature on complex systems failure 
suggests that for many cases, on investigation, evidence was discovered that there had been 
‘signs’ that disaster was emerging from organisational ‘noise’ (Perrow, 1984; Turner & Pidgeon 
1997; Boin & Lagadec, 2000; Comfort et. al., 2001, Rijpma, 1997).   
 
The ‘incubation’ of these failures over time and the failure to note the presence of 
‘warning signs’ are symptoms of organisations that have been termed ‘crisis prone’ (Turner & 
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Pidgeon 1997; Mitroff et. al., 1989; Pearson & Mitroff, 1993; Mitroff & Alpaslan, 2003).  For 
explanatory purposes such incidents might be seen as caused not just from the failure to notice of 
signs but from a failure of organisational systems to respond to them.      
 
Equally there are situations where, as a result of extreme systems complexity, warning 
signs may not have been visible or if detectable, not understood.  While not the same category as 
the ‘ideal’ situation above, where a crisis signalling its arrival could have been detected, this 
second category may be the result of totally new systems behaviour or some other source of 
perturbation. 
 
Maritime supply chains are susceptible to terrorism and other perturbations because of 
their open nature nationally and globally and their complexity (Van de Voort, M., et. al., 2003).  
Further, the complex organisation and unique vulnerabilities of ports and associated support 
components are not easily appreciated or understood (Harrald, Stephens & van Dorp, 2004).  The 
U.S. Government Accounting Office has suggested also that difficulties in coordination among 
public and private entities with an interest in port security and active at the port itself, generally, 
may make effective security programs hard to establish (Hecker, 2002).   
 
Figure 1 below describes both types of crisis situation.  For explanatory purposes the 
initial type of crisis referred to above (with the presence of warning signs) emerges from a Type 
1 vulnerability.   The suggested definition of this form of vulnerability is as an attribute of an 
organisation with dysfunctional internal control and coordination mechanisms (processes for risk 
management and/or corporate governance) resulting in a reduced capacity to detect warning 
signs or understand their meaning.   This reduced capacity might also be contributed to by 
inflexible cultural factors or belief systems within an organisation itself that promotes notions of 
in-vulnerability or indifference to external or internal threats (Boin & Lagadec, 2000).  Group 
think (Janis, 1972) as a cultural factor at the organisational level, is a manifestation of this 
phenomenon.   As such, Type 1 vulnerability could be diagnosed as an emergent organisational 
tendency to produce high frequency - low consequence incidents.    
 
Figure 1 Here 
 
A Type 2 vulnerability may be described as an attribute of organisations dealing with 
intensely complex systems or ‘systems of systems.’  The problem is not necessarily that internal 
control and coordination tools are not applied diligently (although this might be the case) but one 
in which management processes may not be adequate for the inherent complexity in a system (or 
sub-component of a system) or that the degree of complexity present is not well understood.  
Thus the interacting parts within a complex system lead to an unexpected or surprising 
juxtaposition of causal elements, and thus, failure.  This form of ‘normal accident’ (Perrow, 1984) 
might be expected but not necessarily predictable.    
 
Type 2 vulnerability is an organisational tendency to contribute to low frequency - high 
consequence events.  An additional causal factor that might mimic the emergence of Type 2 
phenomena is terrorist activity some where in the system.      
 
As noted above, processes at ports and in related systems, can be difficult to coordinate.  
Harrald, Stephens and van Dorp (2004) describe Ports as critical nodes in complex economic 
inter-modal subsystems that facilitate the movement of goods and cargo around the world.  
Cargo and passengers are transferred to and from the maritime mode connecting then with other 
transportation modes (e.g. rail, road, or pipeline).   
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Although individual modes (as stand alone systems) may be tightly connected, the 
functional links to other systems within a port can be relatively loose.  A container facility is for 
example, ‘tightly coupled’ with the inter-modal rail yard and the tightly scheduled container 
vessels, but only loosely connected with the adjacent petroleum facility or cruise terminal.  Other 
than provisions against criminal theft and violence, security may not have been a design criterion 
for any of these maritime sub-systems.  This absence of in-built security in the segregated sub-
systems means retrofitting security at international ports will be more than just enhanced asset 
protection.  The application of security planning will be required in all of sub-systems operating 
in a port.  A port security framework, logically, would need to extend well ashore (e.g. security 
for container and other general trade movements) as well as at sea (passenger vessel).  Currently, 
vulnerabilities inherent in such complex economic systems (ports) are not adequately understood 
(Harrald, Stephens and van Dorp, 2004).     
 
A coordinated security regime targeting world trade would have, potentially, to operate under the 
dual constraints of having both Type 1 (interactive sub-systems - a port) and Type 2 (system of 
systems – maritime trade) vulnerability present.   Conceptually, a maritime supply chain may be 
more likely to exhibit a tendency towards Type 2 Vulnerability.     
 
Crisis Management  
The inability to notice and or respond to an emerging crisis discussed above is a critical 
risk for any organisation especially a large business or structure such as a port.  The absence of a 
crisis management capability within such an organisation is a major weakness.  As mentioned 
earlier both ‘slow’ and ‘rapid’ onset crises emerge readily in highly complex systems.  The 
degree of for-warning is dependent often on the sophistication of existing organisational 
monitoring systems available.   
As mentioned earlier the presence of both internal and external vulnerability within 
systems increase the vigilance needed within an organisation.  Crises often create situations that 
cannot be anticipated so ‘warning sign’ detection is critical as is a tested ability to respond to 
emergencies quickly and effectively (Boin & Lagadec, 2000).  The need to have a trained and 
responsive crisis management team seems obvious.   A crisis management capability of this 
nature would entail: 
° A robust threat assessment capability and capacity that includes sub-functions for Environmental 
Scanning (warning signs);  
° Emergency Management Escalation Triggers (incident/issue recognition);  
° Consequence Analysis (understanding how multiple cascading impacts can occur);  
° Crisis Management Decision-making Capacity (separate to routine business decision making 
structures); 
° Clearly stated, understood and tested communication mechanisms for reporting emergent 
incident/issues to the CEO and senior management (Barnes, 2001). 
 
The value of an effective crisis management response capacity covers a number of areas. A 
functional system can: 
° Support the establishment of effective and timely responses to crisis situations; 
° Enhance business (service) continuity; 
° Assist management meet the needs of the public (and regulator) when confronted by technical 
uncertainty and concern; 
° Define short to medium term responses to incidents that entail multiple events (simultaneous 
concurrency) and emergent phenomena that vary over location and time; 
° Promote a capability to anticipate areas of strategic concern, and their implications, before impacts 
occur or become significant;  
° Provide the means for reducing organisational and societal vulnerability to unplanned or 
unexpected change (Barnes, 2001). 
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How might such a Crisis Management capability be developed? An obvious first step is to 
ensure the support of senior management and especially the CEO for the processes involved and 
the benefits that can accrue.   From this critical first step the following needs should be 
considered: 
° Build capacity and capability in applying foresight, via interdisciplinary teams, to issues that can 
limit achievement of organisational goals; 
° Ensure that robust analytical & conceptual frameworks of security risk management and corporate 
governance are developed appropriate to the functions purpose of the business (Barnes, 2001). 
 
Future Research Needs and Implications for Maritime Trade 
Assurance of trade security and continuity of supply chains are critical factors in the 
current global environment.  While the conceptual bases for crisis management and related 
capability defined here derive from the analysis of a number of major organisational systems 
failures, there is a need to confirm the fit of these options to port and maritime trade settings.     
This confirmatory assessment would logically entail research covering the following: 
o Detailing the on-site interactive complexity of critical infrastructure at a major port (or sample of 
ports);  
o Assessment of categories of incidents in the ‘high frequency low consequence’ and ‘low frequency 
high consequence’ categories at these ports - over time (thus allowing a mapping of the Type 1 and 
Type 2 vulnerability); 
o The nature and organisation of current security risk management functions and governance systems 
in place. 
 
  A further issue for investigation is the impact of implementing requirements of the ISPS 
code for operational ports.  A question of particular interest is whether implementation of the 
ISPS code has simplified or increased operational complexity within a port and among the port-
based businesses.  Confirmation of a relationship between increasing complexity and 
vulnerability (as implied in the literature) could follow in addition to an assessment of changes to 
on-site security risk management structures and staffing levels.    
 
An evaluation of the impact of the CSI the C-TPAT initiatives, where implemented, would also 
provide insight into the need for enhanced crisis management capacity and assurance of supply 
chain continuity.  The C-TPAT is of particular importance given the extensive and intrusive 
coverage of the supply it implies and the potential for increases in the cost of trading generally. 
        
Conclusion 
This paper has argued that while the likelihood of emergencies and security-related 
incidents cannot be totally removed there are definite steps that organisations can take to 
mitigate potential losses.  In the case of maritime trade (ports and ship movement) applicable 
capabilities from crisis management seem viable in meeting mitigation goals.   
 
Critical to the successful use of these capabilities is adequate awareness of vulnerabilities 
within relevant business systems and larger trading segments.   This paper has presented a 
conceptual framework that allows a firmer understanding of how vulnerability can manifest 
within such complex trading systems.     
 
Achievement of a measure of influence over both internal and external vulnerability will 
require an enhanced awareness of how to design and operate crisis management systems that are 
both flexible and self-regulatory, exhibiting attention to detail and able to accommodate 
uncertainty and the unexpected. 
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Figure 1: Representation of Type 1 and Type 2 Vulnerability  
